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ABSTRACT

Social Responsibility in Major Newspapers Coverage of
“9/11 Lapses” Controversy

Tran Long Hai

This study measures major newspapers’ performance in covering the “September 11
lapses” controversy against social responsibility principles. Content analysis of 535
newspaper items, published by the New York Times, Washington Post, San Francisco
Chronicle, USA Today in one year (Sept. 12, 2001-Sept. 11, 2002), found the papers did
not live up to journalistic precepts traditionally listed as required for the press in a
democratic society. They were successful in providing a source of comprehensive and
balanced information, a forum for exchange of comment and criticism on the
government’s losses and failures. However, major newspapers failed to aggressively
pursue independent investigative journalism as a watchdog representing the people’s right
to know.
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INTRODUCTION
To the U.S. media, First Amendment freedom and social responsibility are the
most fundamental concepts. The combination of two elements is crucial for the American
press to practice its belief in the ethical mission of “truth about the fact.”1
The formula functioned well during the Vietnam War era when a free and
skeptical press rebelled against government secrecy and manipulation to serve the
public’s right to know. Watershed cases such as The Pentagon Papers, Watergate, or The
Selling of the Pentagon2 set out new standards for freer and more socially responsible
operation of the media.
However, this democratic trend has been going backward, rather than forward,
since then. Recent surveys show ratings of the news at record lows as Americans are
more dissatisfied with information quality.3 Media practitioners bitterly complained about

1

Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1947), 21.
2

In 1971, with the news documentary The Selling of the Pentagon exposing massive Pentagon propaganda
for increased U.S. intervention and its widespread efforts to deceive reporters about the Vietnam War, CBS
became involved in a major dispute with the government. CBS was accused of distortion, biased and
unpatriotic coverage of the war. The Congress, with support from the White House, believed it had the
authority to investigate broadcast news, asking for outtakes of unedited film for the program, which CBS
refused to provide. CBS President Frank Stanton was subpoenaed to appear before a House committee with
the outtakes, he again refused, defending his action under freedom of the press. The committee voted to
hold him in contempt of Congress, however, the whole House voted not to bring the charges against him.
The Selling of the Pentagon established First Amendment protection for the broadcast press against a
review of the edits made. It resisted the power of the government in time of war to manage the news,
opposing the use of subpoenas to intimidate the press. Detailed discussion of this matter can be seen in
Corydon B. Dunham, Fighting for the First Amendment: Stanton of CBS vs. Congress and the Nixon White
House (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997).
3

Rebecca Ann Lind, “Competing Ethos: Reliance on Profit Versus Social Responsibility by Laypeople
Planning a Television Newscast,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001):
118-134.

1

2
the government’s increased control of the press in the wake of Vietnam. They contended
that the blame game against the news media for U.S. failure in the conflict drove
succeeding governments to various attempts to withhold or censor information, thus
hindering the watchdog role of the press.4 Meanwhile, media critics charged that the
profit-driven corporate media failed to aggressively check on those government agencies
that serve elite interests, leading to a decline of journalism as a public service.5 Citing
examples of the abuse of the press freedom to publish with disregard for truth as
evidence, some even questioned the ethical credibility of the news media, accusing them
of contempt of the public.6
These arguments raise a noteworthy question to be considered: how should the
social responsibility theory be tested under current circumstances with the erosion of First
Amendment and civic principles? To measure the performance of today’s press in its
socially responsible role, case studies should be conducted with the focus on the use of
investigative journalism to track down major stories of public interest. As part of the

4

Stanley W. Cloud, “The Pentagon and the Press,” Nieman Report 55, no.4 (Winter 2001): 13-16.

5

Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times
(Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 15-77.
6

The most cited case has been the notorious scandal in 1980, when Janet Cooke of the Washington Post
was forced to surrender her Pulitzer Prize after it was disclosed that her prize-winning investigative story
about an eight-year-old heroin addict named “Jimmy” was a phony. Recently, the controversial debate over
media credibility reemerged to public attention, when Jayson Blair of the New York Times acknowledged
that he fabricated and plagiarized quotes in numerous stories. Rob Anderson, Robert Dardenne, and
George M. Killenberg, The Conversation of Journalism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 182-184;
Howard Kurtz, “More Reporting By Times Writer Called Suspect” Washington Post, 8 May 2003, sec. C,
p.1

3
efforts, this research examines how leading newspapers served the public with
information on a typically emotional issue at a sensitive time. Observations from the
perspective of an exemplary scenario, to some extent, will contribute a close look into the
current nature of press operation in the framework of social responsibility ideals.

RESEARCH QUESTION
Because of the magnitude of the story itself, the most compelling question asked
in the wake of September 11 is why it had happened. Though various factors surrounded
the tragic events should be considered, it is true to contend that the inability to prevent the
terrorist plot was the worst embarrassment to the U.S. intelligence community. However,
for months after the attacks, U.S. leaders insisted they had no warnings to prepare for
them. The case then became a controversial issue when leaked information in May 20027
revealed the government’s failure to act on alarming signals prior to September 11. Given
the circumstances, the U.S. media were required by the social responsibility theory to
perform the ethical duty to find out the whole truth. In other words, they should play the
watchdog role to serve the people’s right to know.
But the September 11 tragedy also involved other sensitive factors that hindered
aggressive efforts of investigative journalism. Americans have never had such massive
loss of life where civilians were attacked by terrorists on American soil. While the

7

The timeline is detailed in Appendix.

4
public’s desire to have the “why” question answered was real, Americans somehow
endorsed wartime censorship,8 the government maximized efforts to withhold and
manipulate information, and the media saw the special need to exercise self-restraint.9
The unique situation was a fair opportunity for the government to wield patriotism and
national security in wartime against critical reporting.10
Historically, the performance of leading newspapers at critical times testified to
their preeminence as independent institutions representing the public to hold government
accountable. Watershed cases such as The Pentagon Papers or Watergate in the 1970s
produced various legendary examples of how daring journalists fought against and
prevailed over the government’s lies and concealments. Major newspapers of national
record like the New York Times, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today
have long been among the most important sources of information to foster public
understanding of divisive issues. Thanks to their excellence in reporting efforts, the New
York Times and Washington Post remain in the top list of Pulitzer winners each year. In
the era of media convergence, the two elite newspapers continue to assume the agendasetting function for the press.11 The San Francisco Chronicle is the largest newspaper in
Northern California and the second largest on the West Coast, reaching 1.25 million

8

Al Cross, “‘New America’ May Forget Old Values,” Quill 90, no. 1 (January/February 2002): 4.

9

Gina Barton, Beverly Campbell, “Patriotism and the News,” Quill 89, no. 10 (December 2001): 18-21.

10

Maria Trombly, “Ethics and War,” Quill 89, no. 10 (December 2001): 14-17.

11

Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed., (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), viii-xlvii.
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readers daily. With its giant circulation of 2.2 million, the USA Today, in one way or
another, has disproportionate influence over the public and national events.
With revelations of intelligence lapses prior to September 11, major newspapers
once again faced the moment of truth to test their vitality as the Fourth Estate at public
service.
How did major newspapers provide news coverage of the issue?
How did they foster public understanding and discussion about the controversy?
How did they use investigative journalism?
How did they serve the public’s right to know?
This case study of leading newspapers’ work on the major story will offer an
insight into the typical application of social responsibility principles as it is in the
operation of today’s press.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Social Responsibility Doctrine
To understand the performance of contemporary newspapers from the perspective
of social responsibility doctrine, it is necessary to precede with an overall review of the
evolution of the theory. This will provide the theoretical context for the study to be
conducted.
In the media world, the term social responsibility has been widely used as a
philosophy, or a doctrine of press operation. It is a normative theory that describes the

6
news media’s ideal function or a set of ideas of how the media do and should perform. It
is believed that the social responsibility theory developed in the 20th century in the
United States, evolving from professional principles set by media practitioners, media
codes, and especially the work of the Commission on Freedom of the Press (Hutchins
Commission).12 But, according to J. Herbert Altschull, social responsibility is “an ancient
doctrine, one that had already been alluded to the writings of Plato and Aristotle, one that
has been reaffirmed in every generation since (John) Milton.”13 The work of the Hutchins
Commission, he observed, had written the term social responsibility with modern
meaning into the world of the U.S. media.14
In 1947, with the published report A Free and Responsible Press this group made
social responsibility a formalized concept of media operation. The Commission
encouraged greater responsibility of the press and more surveillance from the informed
public to check on its improved performance. It set five crucial requirements for the
press, which should provide the public with:

-

a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a
context that gives them meaning, truth about the fact;
a forum for exchange of comment and criticism;
a representative picture of the constituent groups in society;
the representation and clarification of the goals and values of the society;

12

Werner J. Severin, James W. Tankard, Jr. , Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, and Uses in the
Mass Media, 5th ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001), 314.
13

J. Herbert Altschull, From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind American Journalism (New York &
London: Longman, 1990), 285.
14

J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs, 1st ed. (New York
& London: Longman, 1984), 180.
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-

full access to the day’s intelligence for every member of the society.

15

With the publication of Four Theories of the Press in 1956, social responsibility
was officially called a media theory in the classification of the world’s press systems
based on the press-government relationship (others included authoritarian, libertarian and
Soviet communist doctrines). Theodore Peterson reset functions of the press under social
responsibility theory as follows:
-

servicing the political system by providing information, discussion and
debate on public affairs;
enlightening the public so as to make it capable of self-government;
safeguarding the rights of the individual by serving as a watchdog against
government;
servicing the economic system, primarily by bringing together the buyers
and sellers of goods and services through the medium of advertising;
providing entertainment;
maintaining its own financial self-sufficiency so as to be free from the
pressure of special interests.16

In his Agents of Powers in 1984, Altschull claimed social responsibility was an
absurd term “devoid of meaning,” whose content was “so vague that almost any meaning
can be placed upon it.”17 Though social responsibility has been perceived as a vital
principle in the media’s system of values, the term itself has never been available in
dictionaries due to its obscure origin and abstract nature. The author rejected the notion
expressed in Four Theories of the Press that social responsibility only existed as a

15

Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press, 21-28.

16

Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1956), 74.
17

Altschull, Agents of Power, 301-305.
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doctrine of media operation in Anglo-American societies.
“No authority wants its press to practice just any kind of social responsibility,” he
wrote. “What is wanted is the kind of social responsibility that suits a particular
conception of the social order.”18 According to Atschull, today there are three models of
the press (Market, Marxist, and Advancing), all of which endorse the socially responsible
role, but in different ways.
His definitions of these models --based on comparisons of purposes of journalism,
articles of faith, and views on press freedom-- went as follows:

MARKET MODEL
Purposes of Journalism
to seek truth
to be socially responsible
to inform (or educate) in a non-political way
to serve the people impartially; to support capitalist doctrine
to serve as watchdog of government
Articles of Faith
The press:
is free of outside interference
serves the public’s right to know
seeks to learn and present the truth
reports fairly and objectively
Views on Press Freedom
journalists are free of all outside controls
the press is not servile to power and is not manipulated by power
no national press policy is needed to insure a free press

18

Ibid., 201-204.

9
MARXIST MODEL
Purposes of Journalism
to search for truth
to be socially responsible
to educate the people and enlist allies (in a political way)
to serve the people by demanding support for socialist doctrine
to mold views and change behavior
Articles of Faith
The press:
transforms false consciousness and educates workers into
class consciousness
provides for objective needs for the people
facilitates effective change
reports objectively about the realities of experience
Views on Press Freedom
a free press means that the opinions of all people are published, not only
those of the rich
a free press is required to counter oppression
a national press policy is required to guarantee that a free press takes the
correct form
ADVANCING MODEL
Purposes of Journalism
to serve truth
to be socially responsible
to educate (in a political way)
to serve the people by seeking, in partnership with government, change for
beneficial purposes
to serve as an instrument of peace
Articles of Faith
The press is:
a unifying and not a divisive force
a device for beneficial social change
an instrument of social justice
meant to be used for two-way exchanges between journalists and readers
Views on Press Freedom
a free press means freedom of conscience for journalists
press freedom is less important than the viability of the nation

-

10
a national press policy is needed to provide legal safeguards for freedom.19

In relation to social responsibility doctrine, Atschull reached the following
conclusions:

In all three movements of the symphony, the press is assigned the purpose
of serving the people. This service is described in different terms. To those who
believe in the virtue of the market system of economics, the news media meant to
support that system; to those who believe in Marxism-Leninism, the media are
meant to support socialist doctrine. In the market image, the press is seen as
operating outside the control of government, as a watchdog, or even a kind of
adversary of the government. In the Marxist image, the press is the creature of the
government (or the Party), endorsing its actions and seeking to persuade its
readers and viewers to the same kind of endorsement. Among the advancing
nations, however, the image is different: It is of news media that serve as
partners of government.20
We can say that the serious American press as a whole is convinced that
what it is doing, it is doing in the interests of the public, the public that has a right
to know what is going on in the public life in order to carry out its duties as
citizens, thereby fulfilling the democratic assumption... The Marxist articles of
faith assert the belief that the news media in Marxist society serve the needs and
the interests of the masses... In the advancing world, efforts have been undertaken
to bring about a more horizontal pattern.21
All press systems endorse the doctrine of social responsibility, proclaim
that they serve the needs and interests of the people, and state their willingness to
provide access to the people.22

After almost forty years, in retrospect, the University of Illinois published Last

19

Ibid., 279-299.

20

Ibid., 285-286.

21

Ibid., 289-290.

22

Ibid., 298.
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Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press to give a final word on the relevance of
Four Theories of the Press in the era of media convergence. Reviewing theoretical
shortcomings, internal inconsistencies and inadequacies, the authors came to the
conclusion that social responsibility was formulated as a normative theory of press
operation without rigorous examination and testing of hypotheses. Additionally, the book
offered a new look at social responsibility as a complex of different theories with
conservative, moderate, and radical models included in its simplest form of combination.
The authors put:

In fact, social responsibility theory seems to contain within it several
different theories. We can identify at least three.
First, there is a conservative model. This calls for limited adjustments –
“Let’s just all try a little harder to be fair”- to forestall more radical proposals.
Such a call for socially responsible media is little different from the enlightened
libertarianism that characterizes mainstream advertising practices. It expects
media to remain primarily market- and profit-driven.
A second, moderate model calls for the profit motive to be severely
curtailed but only in the presentation of news and opinion. The moderate position
wants a benevolent elite of expert professional journalists to be insulated from
the crasser concerns of media owners and thus to be free to serve a public that is,
of course, also crass but not as canny as the wealthy and powerful. Thus, a
protected community of professionals will allow a larger competitive,
individualistic society to operate with a modicum of fairness.
A third, radical model calls for transformation of the greater society itself.
Instead of responsible media serving an essentially individualistic, competitive
public, they should be engaged in supporting and creating a communitarian
public. Indeed, truly responsible media can exist only in the context of real
communities, communities conceived of as not just based on geographical
proximity of superficial interactions among individuals but as the shared creation
of a common life, culture, or identity (Christians, Ferre, and Fackler 1993).
These three models meet the standards and requirements of social
responsibility theory. While they seem only marginally compatible with each
other, they still share some characteristics, especially on the level of policy. They
all hope for change to come from moral behavior rather than government action.

12
They all worry at least a little about the ability of the “free market” to resolve
social conflict. And they all decline to demand structural change in media
industries - even though the communitarians come close.23

By 1995, in The Power of News, Michael Schudson made his own list of seven
responsibilities for the press to fulfill in democracy. They included:
-

-

to provide citizens fair and full information so they can make sound
decisions;
to provide coherent frameworks to help citizens comprehend the complex
political universe;
to serve as common carriers of the perspectives of the varied groups in
society;
to provide the quantity and quality of news that people want;
to represent the public and speak for and to the public interest in order to
hold government accountable;
to evoke empathy and provide deep understanding so that citizens can
appreciate the situation of other human beings in the world and so elites
can come to know and understand the situation of other human beings,
notably nonelites, and learn compassion for them;
to provide a forum for dialogue among citizens that not only informs
democratic decision making but is, as process, an element in it.24

Though social responsibility is a theory that describes the news media’s ideal
function rather than an empirically tested one, its application has been highly developed
both in professional practices and academic studies. For media practitioners, social
responsibility is one of the most fundamental principles in the press’ system of ethical
and professional values. As to media researchers, the theory is the helpful guide to assess
the performance of the news media in accommodating public expectations in democratic

23

William E. Berry et al., Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press, ed. John C. Nerone (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1995), 122-123.
24

Michael Schudson, The Power of News (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 28-29.
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societies. This research proposes using social responsibility as the standard tool to
measure major newspapers’ efforts to meet the demand of credible and accountable
journalism at a critical time.

Agenda Setting as a Social Responsibility
In order to see how well newspapers of national record fulfilled their socially
responsible obligations to the people in need of information on an emotional issue,
attention should be paid to an important point: how did they perform in fostering public
understanding and discussion about the subject? By charging the press with the role of
providing “intelligent account of the day’s events,”25 “enlightening the public,”26 social
responsibility theory had envisioned the agenda setting function of the press even before
the term was established in the early 1970s.
The agenda-setting hypothesis began with Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L.
Shaw in 197227 as an antithesis to the limited-effect theoretical position that was
dominant in mass communication

research

at the time. It was a breakthrough

development of the ideas set our by precursors (Walter Lippman,28 Norton E. Long,29

25

Commission on Freedom of the Press, 21.

26

Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, 74.

27

Maxwell E. McCombs, Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 36, no. 2 (summer 1972): 176-187.
28

29

Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: McMilan, 1922; reprint, New York: The Free Press, 1965)

Norton E. Long, “The Local Community as an Ecology of Games,” American Journal of Sociology 64
(1958): 251-261.
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Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang,30 and Bernard C. Cohen31) that the media had the
capability, through repeated news coverage, of raising the importance of an issue in the
public’s mind. Since then, the agenda-setting hypothesis has been expanded and become
one of the most influential in modern mass communication research.32 Hundreds of
studies have been conducted to cover various aspects of the agenda-setting process. With
the emphasis on how the media agenda is set, how the public agenda influences the policy
agenda,33 the research literature has thoroughly addressed such questions as:
-

-

relationship between news coverage and public perception of the
importance of the issues;
media coverage and reality;
causal relationship between media agenda and public agenda;
priming process in which the media attend to some issues and not others
and thereby alter the standards by which people evaluate election
candidates;
obtrusiveness of the issue as a factor in agenda setting process;
abstract and concrete issues in agenda setting;
time needed for agenda setting;
the role of media exposure;
the need for orientation;
who set the media agenda;
media agenda and policy agenda;
how does agenda setting work;

30

Kurt Lang, Gladys Engel Lang, “The Mass Media and Voting,” in American Voting Behavior, eds. E.
Burdick, A. J. Brodbeck (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), 217-235.
31

Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 13.

32

David K. Perry, Theory and Research in Mass Communication: Contexts and Consequences, 2nd ed.
(Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2002), 207.
33

Shearon A. Lowery, Melvin L. DeFleur, Milestones in Mass Communication Research: Media Effects, 3d
ed. (New York: Longman Publishers USA, 1995), x.

15
-

second level of agenda setting.34

Among recent works concerning agenda setting function of the press, some have
been advancing “beyond the study of the formation of agendas by the press to consider
how ideas of agenda setting might be applied in ways to make society work better.”35 In
reality, the concept of agenda setting is much related to the values and beliefs used by
journalists to determine the responsibility of the press in providing the society with proper
information. For that reason, proponents of this academic approach argued

that

democracy requires that the media engage in “meaningful agenda setting.”36 Donald L.
Shaw and some other scholars such as S. E. Martin, R. F. Carter, K. R. Stamm, and K.
Heintz-Knowles suggested using the study of agenda setting to encourage the media to
better serve the public through the agenda setting function.37
Jay Rosen and A.C. Shepard, leading members of the avant-garde movement,
even recommended the notion of public journalism, or civic journalism, as a practical
application of agenda-setting theory. This kind of journalism, they argued, would be
committed to serving the community better by identifying the important issues and

34

Severin, Tankard, Jr. , Communication Theories, 219-244.

35

Ibid., 242.

36

M. Gurevitch, J.G. Blumler, “Political Communication Systems and Democratic Values,” in Democracy
and the Mass Media, ed. J. Lichtenberg (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 269-289.
37

Detailed discussions of this matter can be seen in Journalism Quarterly 69 (1992): 868-877, and 902920.
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appropriately focusing on the public agenda.38 Some scholars believe civic journalism
broadens the concept of journalistic social responsibility into a more active role.39
In 1983, with the suggestion of agenda building as an expanded concept of agenda
setting, the Langs contributed a new step forward in the evolution of research literature.
Their work, The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press and the Polls During
Watergate,40 is as much important for another reason: for the first time ever, researchers
studied the role of the press as an agenda setter during a major crisis with its coverage of
government misdoings (Watergate).
Since the late 1980s, some scholars have focused on the influences on media
content, and they found that the elite media have the capability of setting on agenda for
other media. L. H. Danielian and S. D. Reese defined this process as “intermedia agenda
setting” and noted that the New York Times is the most influential intermedia agenda
setter which can lead other media and shape media content.41
By 1992, in his Media and Apocalypse: News Coverage of the Yellowstone Forest

38

Jay Rosen, “Politics, Vision, and the Press: Toward a Public Agenda for Journalism,” in The New News v.
the Old News: The Press and Politics in the 1990s, eds. J. Rosen and P. Taylor (New York: The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1992), 1-33; A. C. Shepard, “The Gospel of Public Journalism,” American Journalism
Review 16 (1994): 28-35.
39

Peter Gade et al., “Journalists’ Attitudes Toward Civic Journalism Media Roles,” Newspaper Research
Journal 19, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 13-26.
40

Gladys Engel Lang, Kurt Lang, The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press and the Polls
During Watergate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
41

L.H. Danielian, S. D. Reese, “A Closer Look at Intermedia Influences on Agenda Setting: The Cocain
Issue of 1986,” in Communication Campaigns About Drugs: Government, Media, and the Public, ed. P. J.
Shoemaker (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1989), 47-66.

17
Fires, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, and Lora Prieta Earthquake, Conrad Smith provided the
research literature with a clear evidence that policy makers’ most important sources of
information after sudden events are the New York Times and Washington Post.42
With special emphasis given to the study of agenda setting after sudden disasters,
Thomas A. Birkland recently introduced the theory of “focusing events as factors in
agenda setting.”43 The researcher divided what he called focusing events into three
categories:
-

-

“normal” focusing events that can be expected to happen sometime such
as earthquakes, hurricanes, oil spills, and nuclear plant accidents;
“new” focusing events that have never happened before, or have happened
so long as to have faded from memory. They are novel or near-novel and
may lead to the predictable search for blame. Three examples of this
category are the Tylenol poisoning incident in the early 1980s, the loss of
the space shuttle Challenger in 1986, and the terrorist bombing of a
federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995;
“common events under uncommon circumstances” are generally common
events, such as accidents, that gain greater attention due to some unique
and unusual feature.44

According to Birkland, focusing events are “so hard to keep off the agenda, and,
by definition, will become more difficult to contain as they gain broader attention.”45 In
observation of the work of the press in the wake of such events, he made some significant
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points related to its agenda-setting role after major disasters:
There is often little need for groups to provoke the press into immediate
coverage of a major dramatic event. The drama and novelty of a potential focusing
event is often sufficient to elevate the issue on the media agenda. This is an
important difference between potential focusing events and “media events” that
are largely preplanned by contenders in a political controversy. Over the long
term, groups that want policy change must exploit a potential focusing event to
keep the issue fresh and relatively high on the agenda, lest the problem recede
from the media and institutional agendas. But in the immediate term -three to six
months after the event- news coverage of the problem revealed by the event will
be easily discernible and at a significantly greater level than before the event.46

These insights can add more depth to a research of how major newspapers
covered a typically emotional issue at a sensitive time, more specifically, the “September
11 lapses” in the wake of the terrorist attacks.

Prior Restraint vs. Social Responsibility
Social responsibility doctrine emphasizes the role of the press as “national
conscience” and “protagonist for the people in keeping their rulers responsible and
honest.”47 The theory envisions the socially responsible operation of the press, which is
expected to use its freedom to check on government as a public watchdog. In the
framework of social responsibility principles, the function of the press is to question, pry
and criticize government actions and inactions in assistance of American self-
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government.48
While First Amendment protections provide the U.S. media with immense power
to act independently and free from government regulation of news content, there still are
rational limits on investigative journalism when national security is at stake.49 Studies of
free press in the United States suggest that the desire for those limits or other kinds of
restraint has often arisen during times of insecurities about the survival of the nation and
of its democratic system.50 In the meantime, researchers also contend that one barometer
of speech freedoms in society is whether those freedoms exist even in times of national
crisis.51
Therein lies the problem that tests the viability of the ideas of social responsibility
theory. For some special reason, prior restraint can be seen as necessary protection of
society despite its contradiction of First Amendment principles, whereas the press may
have to surrender its vital role of serving the people’s right to know despite its
uncompromising integrity. The conflict is also joined between the government’s need to
gain public support for emergency efforts and the belief of the press that its most
important function is to ferret out and report the truth.52
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Though it has been established in the watershed case Near v. Minnesota53 since
1931 that the chief purpose of the constitutional guaranty would be to prevent previous
restraints upon publication, prior restraints continued to be exerted though time.
According to many media law experts, during the last several years, government
attempts to use prior restraint have taken place with almost predictable regularity,
especially when some form of crisis occurs.54 Cited the need for confidentiality as vital
for what is called the greater good (i.e., national survival), U.S. administrations have
tended to increase pressures to keep information from the people, regardless of their right
to free flow of information. Court decisions have discouraged government pre-publication
censorship, but confirmed that protection as to prior restraint would not be absolutely
unlimited.55 In The Pentagon Papers case, which has been considered as one of the
biggest victories for the press, the Supreme Court even made clear that freedom to
publish did not absolve the New York Times and the Washington Post from the risk of
criminal prosecution for revealing government secrets. For the first time in American
history, federal court decisions found acceptable for some kinds of pre-publication
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censorship.56
Research literature in each decade since the 1970s found that prior restraint would
assume so many guises that it “cannot safely be said that battles against pre-publication
controls are ever won, once and for all time.”57 Since the end of the Vietnam War, when
the press collided with government bent on protecting its own interest and functions
through prior restraint,58 government pre-publication censorship has become less
dramatic, but more diverse and more sophisticated. As the government increased attempts
to use secrecy and national security as obstacles to information access, the news media
found themselves “hog-tied and blindfolded, utterly unable to provide the public with
truth.”59
In the wake of September 11, with controversial disclosures of intelligence lapses
prior to terrorist attacks, the U.S. press faced the moment of truth to carry out its mission
of public service. In the meanwhile, the event provides a means to examine if the social
responsibility theory that describes the news media’s ideal function can be tested in its
exemplary collision with prior restraint and self-censorship inspired by patriotism.
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HYPOTHESIS
Given the magnitude of September 11 and its aftermath, the reporting of and the
investigation into missed signals leading up to terrorist attacks tested the vitality of
leading newspapers as independent institutions representing the people to keep the
government honest and accountable. Examining their work on the divisive issue, this
research project argued:
H1: Major newspapers provided adequate information to help foster public
understanding and discussion about the “September 11 lapses” controversy.
H2: Major newspapers provided balanced reporting and a forum for exchange of
diverse ideas on the issue.
H3: Major newspapers played the active role of investigative journalism to serve
the people’s right to know. These newspapers, as a public watchdog, aggressively
checked on losses and failures against government secrecy.
H4: Major newspapers met criteria listed as required to live up to the established
theory of social responsibility.

METHODOLOGY
The principal and ultimate objective of the research project is to test the social
responsibility theory by evaluating the manner in which major newspapers, the New York
Times, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle and USA Today, covered the
“September 11 lapses” controversy.
In this research, social responsibility means a set of journalistic precepts
22

23
traditionally accepted as criteria to assess how the press performs in a democratic society.
They are:
-

-

To provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day’s
events,60 including information, discussion and debate on public affairs;61
To form a forum for exchange of comment and criticism;62
To provide full access to the day’s intelligence for every member of the
society63 and serve as the common carriers of the perspective of the varied
groups in society;64
To enlighten the public65 to help citizens comprehend the complex
political universe;66
To safeguard the rights of individual by serving as a watchdog against
government;67
To represent the public and speak for and to the public interest in order to
hold government accountable.68

The reason for choosing the New York Times, Washington Post, San Francisco
Chronicle, USA Today is based on the following propositions. Among powerful
newspapers across the nation, the New York Times, Washington Post, San Francisco
Chronicle, USA Today decidedly shape the way each major story of national concern is
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reported. Top Pulitzer winners -the New York Times and Washington Post- and San
Francisco Chronicle, which is known as the “Voice of the West,” are part of the prestige
press from coast to coast. They serve as the most authoritative source of information and
the conscience of American journalism. USA Today, a Gannett newspaper, earns popular
reputation thanks to its largest readership in the land. The four newspapers constitute an
important force, whose voice has disproportionate influence over the public, the media,
national leaders, and national events. They are natural subjects for any research on
contemporary major newspapers.
This study involved a content analysis in one year of coverage (September 12,
2001-September 11, 2002) of the government’s failure to heed attack signs and the
investigation into what was not done to prevent the terrorist plot. Given that the story
came to dominate the media agenda in May and June 2002,69 the time frame offers
insights into what leads the major newspapers followed and how far they followed them.
The research carried out various pilot tests to develop search terms for locating a
census of full text, relevant stories on the Lexis-Nexis database. It administered a series
of computerized literature searches using the terms Sept. 11, intelligence, along with
F.B.I., C.I.A., security, alarm, alert, warning, signal, lapse and failure as key words in
gathering data.
The sample for each newspaper was open to news and Op-Ed/Commentary items
of any type or length, as long as they mainly focused on or specifically mentioned to the
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“missed signals” story. These included discussions on government’s inability to foil the
terrorist plot, intelligence failure, ignorance of attack signs, and the probe into the
September 11 lapses. Weekly reviews were generally excluded with the exception of
those items that could stand out as independent pieces to offer in-depth comments on the
subject. Non-news items including captions for graphics and photographs, excerpts from
statements or interviews, charts, facts and figures were discarded. Given these
considerations, the research selected 535 newspaper items for analysis, including 192
articles from the New York Times; 178 by Washington Post; 88 from USA Today; and 77
by San Francisco Chronicle.
This study set out to weigh the balance of the newspapers’ coverage in the debate
over the “September 11 lapses” by attending to the time element and its corresponding
implications in news frequency, front-page placement, story treatment, story length,
sourcing, and author. In addition to manifest analysis, the research took further attempts
at latent analysis to evaluate if the New York Times, Washington Post, San Francisco
Chronicle, and USA Today lived up to the assumed role of social responsibility. These
included the use of tone and independent investigative reporting to set an agenda for the
news media, the diversity of views expressed in Op-Ed/Commentary items (i.e.,
editorials, letters to editor, columns, commentaries.)
Each coding category was analyzed according to a classification scheme, by which
a particular operational definition was employed.
New frequency was defined as the number of times “missed signals” stories were
repeated in a given period.
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Front-page placement means front-page space given to top stories of the day.
Every news article started on the front page was counted as a front-page story, and this
rule also applied to news items with a sky box on the front page.
Story treatment (or genre) was defined as the way each newspaper item was
written. Any article that emphasized facts (e.g. straight news, in-depth news analysis, or
news feature) was coded as a news story, while each item that offered a first-person
opinion or a stated opinion of the newspaper (e.g. editorial, letter to editor, column,
commentary) was considered as an Op-Ed/Commentary article.
Analysis of story length only considered news articles. To determine if a news
item is a long story, coders were instructed to use the 1,000-word limit to measure up.
Accordingly, medium articles range from 500 to 999 words, and short ones are under 500
words.
The sampling frame for author analysis was news category. Names of authors
were counted every single time they appeared on the byline of a story. When an article
was co-authored, it should be attributed to each individual.
Manner of reporting means how the reporter used his or her efforts to cover news.
The context in which information was gathered and reported reveals how hard the
reporter tried to dig the story out. Only items coded as news stories were part of the
sample, while coders, depending on whether information was gathered from public events
(i.e., hearings, news conferences...) or by investigative efforts (i.e., special arrangements
to reach out for exclusive news), were asked to identify them either as event-based or
original reporting articles. In cases where independent attempts were made to further the
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so-called “continuing news,”70 they were not classed with original reporting items, but
with event-based group. Continuing news here means a series of stories following up a
major dramatic event in one week since it comes to dominate media agenda.
The sampling frame for sourcing analysis was news articles. Both named and
anonymous sources were taken into account as long as they provided relevant opinion or
information on the subject in a direct quote, partial quote, attributed statement, or
paraphrase. This research did not seek to know what the sources said. Instead, it
examined the use of original sources against the reliance on sources from public events
and information from other media. The point of analysis is to compare the percentages
scored by each kind of source in the sample. Original sources were defined as individuals
who responded to exclusive interviews, or unique documents obtained by investigative
efforts. In cases where statements or documents were recorded without any special
arrangements (e.g. in a news conference, televised address, or hearing) they should be
attributed to sources from public events. These also include information, statements or
opinions exclusively quoted by a newspaper to give more details on a public event. When
relevant information was cited from any other news organizations (not the home
newspaper,) it should be credited to other media sources.
View analysis: This study tracked different patterns of views expressed in OpEd/Commentary items (i.e., editorials, letters to editor, columns, commentaries) to
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ascertain whether the debate over the “missed signals” in each newspaper appeared
biased (i.e., framing the issue from a single standpoint) or diverse (i.e., telling the story
from both sides). Positions on the divisive issue were coded as defensive, balanced, and
critical of the alleged intelligence failure. Defensive views range from the endorsement of
government arguments, the criticism of the so-called “finger pointing,” or “second
guessing,” to the opposition to broad investigations into “September 11 lapses.”
Balanced arguments support efforts to check on flaws, but oppose attempts to play the
blame game. Critical positions include suggestions to hold the government accountable,
asking for a thorough probe into unheeded attack signs.
Tone analysis: To see how elite newspapers raised the issue on the media
agenda, this research weighed whether or not they described the alleged “security lapses”
as questionable before May 2002, when disclosures of the government’s failure to heed
attack signs ignited more attempts to investigate.71 An examination of the tone in related
stories published before dramatic developments in May 2002 would reveal each
newspaper’s plan to set the news agenda. Articles in both news and Op-Ed/Commentary
categories were part of the sample, but kept distinctively separate. Tones were coded as
highly suspicious, somewhat suspicious, or little suspicious of a government ignorance of
alarm signals. Highly suspicious tone can be defined as an open, direct or explicit
indication of a government inaction on collected intelligence. Stories with somewhat
suspicious tone expressed some implicit doubts but stopped short of holding government
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responsible. In cases where there was no reference, either explicit or implied, to such
accusations, they are items without suspicious tone.
These observations were given to each newspaper’s coverage to evaluate
individual performance. Comparisons were also made to track main patterns in which
major newspapers reported the “September 11 lapses” story. Conclusions were based on
considerations of the balance of major newspapers’ coverage in the debate and their
performance to live up to principles set out by the social responsibility theory.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
H1 stated that major newspapers provided adequate information to help foster
public understanding and discussion about the “September 11 lapses” controversy. An
examination of news frequency, front page placement and length in this study showed
that the hypothesis was accepted.
News Frequency
Overall, in a year from September 12, 2001 to September 11, 2002, the New York
Times, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, and USA Today ran a total number of
535 newspaper items (both news and Op-Ed/Commentary articles) which mainly focused
on or specifically mentioned to the “September 11 lapses” controversy.
While the newspapers, except the San Francisco Chronicle,72 responded to this
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story since day one, the most frequently covered period was May 1-June 30, 2002. Fiftyfive percent (n = 292) of all selected articles from the four newspapers clustered around
this time frame. Little input into the coverage was found in both periods before May and
after June 2002. Available items from September 12, 2001 to April 30, 2002, and from
July 1 to September 11, 2002 comprised 34 % (n = 183) and 11 % (n = 60) of the sample,
respectively. This main pattern was universally reflected in news frequency of each
newspaper. (See Table. 1)
New York Times: Fifty-five percent (n = 106) of all sampling items (n = 192)
appeared in May and June 2002. Thirty percent (n = 58) were found in seven months
before May 2002, while 15 % (n = 28) were published after June 2002.
San Francisco Chronicle: Sixty-seven percent (n = 52) of all selected items (n =
77) clustered around May and June 2002. The “September 11 lapses” story was covered
with a much lower frequency in months before (29 %; n = 22) and after (4 %; n = 3).
Washington Post: Available items in May and June 2002 accounted for 48 % (n =
85) of the sample (n = 178). Meanwhile, lower inputs were contributed by periods before
May 2002 (43 %; n = 77) and after June 2002 (9%; n = 16).
USA Today: May-June 2002 was the most frequently covered period, which made
up 56 % (n = 49) if the population (n = 88). Available items from September 2001 to
April 2002, and

from July to September 2002 comprised 29 % (n = 26) and
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15 % (n = 13), respectively.

Table 1. News Frequency
Sept. 12,2001-Apr. 30, 2002

May 1, 2002-June 30, 2002

July 1, 2002-Sept. 11, 2002

New York Times
(n = 192)

30 % (58)

55 % (106)

15 % (28)

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 77)

29 % (22)

67 % (52)

4 % (3)

Washington Post
(n = 178)

43 % (77)

48 % (85)

9 % (16)

USA Today
(n = 88)

29 % (26)

56 % (49)

15 % (13)

Totals
(n = 535)

34 % (183)

55 % (292)

11 % (60)

Paper

Front-page Placement
In the sampling frame of 332 items coded as news stories, the four newspapers
published 140 articles on the front page. With 42 % of all collected news items appeared
on A1, the “September 11 lapses” story was treated as momentous and highly
newsworthy. This pattern varied by each newspaper, but front-page items accounted for
very high percentages in every individual sample. (See Table. 2)
New York Times: Forty-six percent (n = 59) of all news items (n = 128) was given
front-page space.
San Francisco Chronicle: Fifty percent (n = 12) out of 24 collected items
appeared on the front page.
Washington Post: Front-page articles made up 43 % (n = 50) of available news
stories (n = 116).
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USA Today: Front-page stories accounted for 30 % (n = 19) of the sample for
news items (n = 64).

Table 2. Front-page Placement in News Category
Number of News Stories

Number of Front-page Stories

Percentage of Total

128

59

46 %

San Francisco Chronicle

24

12

50 %

Washington Post

116

50

43 %

USA Today

64

19

30 %

Totals

332

140

42 %

Paper
New York Times

Length Analysis
Long stories, which ran 1,000 words or more, constituted 58 % (n = 192) of all
items coded as news (n = 332) from the four papers. Medium articles with 500 to 999
words represented 36 % (n = 119), and short items of under 500 words accounted for 6
% (n = 21) in the sample. Though the pattern varied from one newspaper to another, the
four papers tended to treat “September 11 lapses” as a major story which deserved
discussions at a substantial length. (See Table. 3)
New York Times: Long and medium items made up 66 % (n = 84) and 29 % (n =
37) of the sample (n = 128), respectively. Meanwhile, only 5 % (n = 7) of all available
news stories were short items.
San Francisco Chronicle: More than half (54 %; n = 13) of collected news stories
(n = 24) were long articles, with the remaining half unevenly divided between medium
items (42 %; n =10) and short stories (4 %; n = 1).
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Washington Post: Sixty-two percent (n = 72) of selected news articles (n = 116)
were identified as long stories. Thirty-five point four percent (n = 41) were items of
medium length, whereas short news articles contributed roughly 2.6 % (n = 3) to the
population.
USA Today: Although long news items only accounted for 36 % (n = 23) in the
sample (n = 64), this percentage, together with 48 % contributed by medium articles (n=
31), outnumbered the sixteen-percent proportion represented short items (n = 10).

Table 3. Analysis of Length in News Category
Paper

Short Articles

Medium Articles

Long Articles

New York Times
(n = 128)

5 % (7)

29 % (37)

66 % (84)

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 24)

4 % (1)

42 % (10)

54 % (13)

Washington Post
(n = 116)

2.6 % (3)

35.4 % (41)

62 % (72)

USA Today
(n = 64)

16 % (10)

48 % (31)

36 % (23)

Totals
(n = 332)

6 % (21)

36 % (119)

58 % (192)

This analysis indicated each of the four papers responded to the “September 11
lapses” story with a real focus. They paid attention to the issue from early on. They gave
higher priority in front page, space and intensity of coverage to the months of May and
June 2002, when dramatic developments of the investigation into intelligence failures
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drew greater public interest.73 The intensity of coverage dropped down after June 2002. In
the sampling frame of 535 newspaper items, 192 articles were published in the New York
Times, 178 in the Washington Post, 77 in the San Francisco Chronicle, and 88 in the
USA Today. Given their individual news agenda, priorities and resources, each and all of
the four papers provided the public the adequate amount of information to comprehend
the “September 11 lapses” controversy.
Findings on frequency, front page and length would be further discussed in a later
section, which addresses H3.

H2 predicted major newspapers provided balanced reporting and a forum for
exchange of diverse ideas on the issue. Analysis of story treatment, tone and view
confirmed this hypothesis.
Story Treatment
In the sample of 535 newspaper items gathered from four major papers, news
stories constituted 62 % (n = 332) against 38 % made up by Op-Ed/Commentary pieces
(n = 203). The pattern of news articles outnumbering Op-Ed/Commentary items was
followed by all newspapers, but the San Francisco Chronicle. (See Table. 4)
San Francisco Chronicle: Sixty-nine percent (n = 53) of selected articles (n = 77)
were Op-Ed/Commentary items, while news stories only represented 31 % (n = 24).
New York Times: News stories outnumbered Op-Ed/Commentary items in the
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sample (n = 192) by thirty-four points: 67 % (n = 128) against 33 % (n = 64).
Washington Post: The difference in the proportions of news stories and OpEd/Commentary items was between 65 % (n = 116) and 35 % (n = 62).
USA Today: Among 88 sampling items, up to 73 % (n = 64) belonged to news
category, while Op-Ed/Commentary pieces made up the remaining 27 % (n = 24).

Table 4. Analysis of Story Treatment
Paper

News Articles

Op-Ed/Commentary Articles

Total

New York Times

128 (67 %)

64 (33 %)

192

San Francisco Chronicle

24 (31 %)

53 (69 %)

77

Washington Post

116 (65 %)

62 (35 %)

178

USA Today

64 (73 %)

24 (27 %)

88

Totals

332 (62 %)

203 (38 %)

535

Tone Analysis
In the sampling frame of 183 newspaper items published by four papers prior to
disclosures in May 2002 of intelligence failures,74 114 (62 %) were news stories, and 69
(38 %) were Op-Ed/Commentary articles.
Among 114 selected news stories, 38.5 % (n = 44) described the September 11
lapses with highly suspicious tone; 45.5 % (n = 52) implied some doubts, and 16 % (n =
18) made no accusations of the government’s inaction on collected intelligence. (See
Table. 5)
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Among 69 collected Op-Ed/Commentary articles, 58 % (n = 40) were identified
with highly suspicious tone; 29 % (n = 20) fell into the “somewhat suspicious” group,
leaving the remaining 13 % (n = 9) for items without any suspicious tone. (See Table. 6)
In varied degrees, the main pattern of articles with somewhat and highly suspicious tone
outnumbering articles without suspicious tone (both in news and Op-Ed/Commentary
categories) were reflected in every newspaper.
New York Times: Prior to May 2002, a total of 58 newspaper items were
published, of which 38 (65.5 %) were identified as news stories and 20 (34.5 %) were
Op-Ed/Commentary articles. Thirty-four percent (n = 13) of selected news stories (n =
38) discussed the September 11 lapses with highly suspicious tone; 53 % (n = 20) implied
some doubts, and 13 % (n = 5) never indicated any accusations. Of 20 selected OpEd/Commentary articles, 65 % (n = 13) were identified with highly suspicious tone, 30 %
(n = 6) were somewhat suspicious, and the remaining 5 % (n = 1) was not suspicious at
all.
San Francisco Chronicle: Twenty two newspaper items were collected in seven
months before May 2002, including 8 news stories (36 %) and 14 Op-Ed/Commentary
articles (64 %). In the news category (n = 8), each group of stories with highly and
somewhat suspicious tones made up 37.5 % (n = 3 for each group), while the remaining
25 % (n = 2) were news articles without suspicious tone. Among 14 collected OpEd/Commentary items, 57 % (n = 8) addressed the issue with highly suspicious tone, 36
% (n = 5) expressed some doubts, and 7 % (n = 1) never implied any accusations.
Washington Post: Among 77 newspaper items found, 49 (64 %) were news stories
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and 28 (36 %) were Op-Ed/Commentary articles. In news category, stories with highly
and somewhat suspicious tone made up 43 % (n = 21) and 45 % (n = 22), respectively of
all collected items (n = 49). Only 12 % (n = 6) of news stories were without suspicious tone.
Out of 28 Op-Ed/Commentary articles, 46 % (n = 13) fell into the “highly-suspicious”
group, the “somewhat-suspicious” constituted 29 % (n = 8), leaving the remaining 25 %
(n = 7) for the “not-suspicious-at-all” articles.
USA Today: Out of 26 newspaper items found, 19 (73 %) were news stories and 7
(27 %) were Op-Ed/Commentary articles. Each group of stories with highly and
somewhat suspicious tones constituted 37 % (n = 7 for each group) of all news articles (n
= 19), leaving the remaining 26 % (n = 5) for items without suspicious tone. Up to 86 %
(n = 6) of selected Op-Ed/Commentary articles (n = 7) fell into the “highly-suspicious”
group. The “somewhat suspicious” accounted for the remaining 14% (n = 1). No items
were found without suspicious tone.

Table 5. Analysis of Tone in News Articles Published before May 2002
Highly suspicious

Somewhat suspicious

Not suspicious at all

New York Times
(n = 38)

34 % (13)

53 % (20)

13 % (5)

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 8)

37.5 % (3)

37.5 % (3)

25 % (2)

Washington Post
(n = 49)

43 % (21)

45 % (22)

12 % (6)

USA Today
(n = 19)

37 % (7)

37 % (7)

26 % (5)

38.5 % (44)

45.5 % (52)

16 % (18)

Paper

Totals
(n = 114)
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Table 6. Analysis of Tone in Op-Ed/Commentary Articles Published before May 2002
Paper

Highly suspicious

Somewhat suspicious

Not suspicious at all

New York Times
(n = 20)

65 (13)

30 % (6)

5 % (1)

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 14)

57 % (8)

36 % (5)

7 % (1)

Washington Post
(n = 28)

46 % (13)

29 % (8)

25 % (7)

USA Today
(n = 7)

86 % (6)

14 % (1)

0 % (0)

Totals
(n = 69)

58 % (40)

29 % (20)

13 % (9)

View Analysis
Critical views were expressed in 51 % (n = 103) of all Op-Ed/Commentary items
(n = 203) published by the four newspapers. Thirty-eight percent (n = 77) OpEd/Commentary pieces addressed the “September 11 lapses” with balanced arguments.
Items with defensive stance could only make up 11 % (n = 23) of the sample.
Though the pattern varied by each newspaper, the New York Times, Washington
Post, San Francisco Chronicle and USA Today seemed universally supportive to
suggestions to check on flaws. (See Table. 7)
New York Times: Among the sampling items (n = 64), 52 % (n = 33) expressed
views critical to the alleged intelligence failures, 39 % (n = 25) offered balanced
comments, and 9 % (n = 6) presented defensive arguments.
San Francisco Chronicle: Items with critical views made up 55 % (n = 29) of the
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sample (n = 53). Balanced arguments represented in 28 % (n = 15) of all OpEd/Commentary pieces, and defensive comments accounted for the remaining 17 % (n =
9).
Washington Post: Forty-eight percent (n = 30) of Op-Ed/Commentary items in the
sample (n = 62) addressed the issue critically; 42 % (n = 26) discussed both sides of the
story; 10 % (n = 6) defended government’s line.
USA Today: Each group of items with critical and balanced views made up 46 %
(n = 11 for each group) of all selected articles (n = 24), whereas “defensive” items
accounted for 8% (n = 2).

Table 7. Analysis of View in Op-Ed/Commentary Category
Paper

Critical

Balanced

Defensive

New York Times
(n = 64)

52 % (33)

39 % (25)

9 % (6)

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 53)

55 % (29)

28 % (15)

17 % (9)

Washington Post
(n =62)

48 % (30)

42 % (26)

10 % (6)

USA Today
(n = 24)

46 % (11)

46 % (11)

8 % (2)

Totals
(n = 203)

51 % (103)

38 % (77)

11 % (23)

These findings suggested that the four papers offered both news and discussion on
the “September 11 lapses” controversy. The San Francisco Chronicle, which published
more Op-Ed/Commentary items than news articles stood out as the only newspaper
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provided more of public discussion than fact-based reporting on the story. Being an
influential regional newspaper on the West Coast, the San Francisco Chronicle had its
own priority and agenda in fostering public understanding of the highly national issue.
Though each newspaper followed a different news agenda in covering the
controversy, they all tried to tell the issue from both sides, taking the diversity of ideas
and perspectives seriously. Before the May 2002 disclosures of intelligence failings leading
to the September 11 tragedy, the four papers tended to question the government’s inability
to prevent terror attacks. In varied degrees, they were inclined to raise the issue with some
suspicious tones. The newspapers were more likely to present critical and balanced views
in the debate about unheeded attack signs, but did not leave out voices defending the
government.
Overall, the four papers served as the authoritative source of information to help
understand the complex political universe. They also constituted a forum for exchange of
comment and criticism.
Observations on story treatment, tone and views would be further discussed in the
next section.

H3 stated that major newspapers played the active role of investigative
journalism to serve the people’s right to know. These newspapers, as a public watchdog,
aggressively checked on losses and failures against government secrecy. Observations on
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manner of reporting, sourcing, author analysis and other findings did not support this
hypothesis.
Manner of Reporting
In the sampling frame of 332 news items gathered from four major papers, 72 %
(n = 239) were identified as event-based reporting articles. The remaining 28% (n = 93)
were counted as original reporting items, which used some form of investigative efforts to
report the “September 11 lapses” story. This main pattern was followed by the four
newspapers with the San Francisco Chronicle was more likely to depend on covering
events when they occurred. (See Table. 8)
San Francisco Chronicle: Eighty-three percent (n = 20) of collected news articles
(n = 24) represented event-based reporting items. Only 17 % (n = 4) were counted as
investigative reports.
New York Times: Event-based reporting items made up 71% (n = 91) in the
sample (n = 128), while original reporting pieces accounted for 29 % (n = 37).
Washington Post: Among 116 sampling news articles, 71 % (n = 82) were eventbased reporting items, and 29 % (n = 34) were investigative reports.
USA Today: Seventy-two percent (n = 46) news stories in the sample (n =
64) were identified as event coverage. Original reporting items constituted the remaining
28 % (n = 18).
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Table 8. Analysis of Manner of Reporting in News Category
Paper

Event-based Reporting

Original Reporting

New York Times
(n = 128)

71 % (91)

29 % (37)

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 24)

83 % (20)

17 % (4)

Washington Post
(n = 116)

71 % (82)

29 % (34)

USA Today
(n = 64)

72 % (46)

28 % (18)

72 % (239)

28 % (93)

Totals
(n = 332)

Sourcing Analysis
Three thousand and eight (3008) sources were found in the sample of 332 news
articles published by four major newspapers. Among them, 42.3 % (n = 1273) were
identified as original sources, 49.8 % (n = 1499) were sources from public events.
Sources from other media accounted for the remaining 7.9 % (n = 236).
The results indicated the papers attempted to reach out for exclusive information
on the “missed signals” story, rather than heavily depended on sources from public
events or other media. However, the pattern was not reflected in all of the four
newspapers. (See Table. 9)
New York Times: In 128 sampling news articles, a total number of 972 sources
were found, of which 42 % (n = 413) were original. Sources from public events made up
51 % (n = 494), leaving the remaining 7 % (n = 65) for sources from other media.
San Francisco Chronicle: There were 194 sources used in 24 news stories.
Sources from public events made up 53 % (n = 103). Eighteen percent (n = 35) were
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sources from other media. Only 29 % (n = 56) of all sources were identified as original.
Washington Post: In the sample of 116 news articles, a total number of 1314
sources were found. Original sources and sources from public events accounted for 45.5
% (n = 598) and 46 % (n = 605), respectively. Only 8.5 % (n = 111) were sources from
other media.
USA Today: There were 528 sources used in 64 news stories. Up to 56.3 % (n =
297) were identified as sources from public events. Thirty-nine percent (n = 206) were
original sources, leaving the remaining 4.7 % (n = 25) for sources from other media.

Table 9. Analysis of Sourcing in News Category
Original Source

Source from Public Events

Source from Other Media

Total

New York Times
(n = 128)

42 % (413)

51 % (494)

7 % (65)

972

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 24)

29 % (56)

53 % (103)

18 % (35)

194

45.5 % (598)

46 % (605)

8.5 % (111)

1314

39 % (206)

56.3 % (297)

4.7 % (25)

528

42.3 % (1273)

49.8 % (1499)

7.9 % (236)

3008

Paper

Washington Post
(n = 116)
USA Today
(n = 64)
Totals
(n = 332)

Author Analysis
Certain authors had comparatively big input into the “September 11 lapses”
coverage of each newspaper. This finding showed that major papers tended to assign
special staff to follow up the momentous and highly newsworthy story. (See Table. 10)
New York Times: Out of 128 selected news items contributed by 45 authors, 26
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articles were authored or co-authored by James Risen (20 %), 24 by David Johnston
(19 %), 16 by Alison Mitchell (13 %) and 14 by Don Van Nattar Jr. (11 %).
Washington Post: Fifty-eight authors contributed a total number of 116 news
stories. Dan Eggen stood out as the most productive author with 26 articles under his
name (22 %). Walter Pincus and Dana Priest each reported 14 % (n = 16) of all collected
items.
San Francisco Chronicle: Marc Sandalow and Edward Epstein each authored or
co-authored 21 % (n = 5) of the sampling news articles (n = 24). Zachary Coile
contributed 17 % (n = 4) of the total.
USA Today: In the sample of 64 news stories, 28 % (n = 18) were reported by
Kathy Kiely, 25 % by Kevin Johnson (n = 16). Toni Locy and John Diamond each
authored or co-authored 16 % (n = 10 for each author) of all selected items.

Table 10. Most Published Authors in News Category
Paper

Author/Number of Stories

Percentage of Total

New York Times
(n = 128)

James Risen: 26
David Johnston: 24
Alison Mitchell: 16
Don Van Nattar Jr.: 14

20 %
19 %
13 %
11 %

Washington Post
(n = 116)

Dan Eggen: 26
Walter Pincus: 16
Dana Priest: 16

22 %
14 %
14 %

San Francisco Chronicle
(n = 24)

Edward Epstein: 5
Marc Sandalow: 5
Zachary Coile: 4

21 %
21 %
17 %

USA Today
(n = 64)

Kathy Kiely: 18
Kevin Johnson: 16
John Diamond: 10
Toni Locy: 10

28 %
25 %
16 %
16 %
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Other Findings
The aforementioned analyses of tone and view in both news and OpEd/Commentary categories75 suggested that the four papers seemed supportive to efforts
to check on flaws and hold government accountable. The dominant tones and views
expressed in all and each of the papers were generally suspicious and critical of the
alleged intelligence lapses.76
Nevertheless, the papers lacked follow-up efforts to investigate in an active
manner. The time element had implications in many aspects of coverage, indicating that
major newspapers mainly rested on reporting events. All of the four papers gave higher
priority in front-page placement, space and intensity of coverage to the May-June 2002
period, when dramatic revelations of the “unheeded attack signs” drew greater public
interest and fueled the debate over intelligence failures.77
New York Times: On average, each day in May and June 2002 had 1.77 articles on
the “September 11 lapses,” against the rates of 0.25 item/day before May and 0.39
item/day after June. Sixty-one percent (n = 36) of all front-page stories (n = 59) were run
in May and June 2002. Fifty-six percent (n = 47) in the total of 84 long items also
appeared in this period.
San Francisco Chronicle: On average, each day in May and June 2002 had 0.87
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articles on the alleged intelligence failings, against the rates of 0.1 item/day before May
and 0.04 item/day after June. Seventy-five percent (n = 9) of all front-page stories (n =
12) appeared in the May-June period. Fifty-four percent (n = 7) of collected long articles
(n = 13) were published in May and June 2002.
Washington Post: On average, each day in May and June 2002 had approximately
1.42 “missed signals” stories, compared to the rates of 0.34 item/day before May and
0.23 item/day after June. Out of 50 front-page articles collected, 52 % (n = 26) were
published in May and June 2002. Half (n = 36) of the total of 72 long items clustered
around this time frame.
USA Today: On average, each day in May and June 2002 had 0.82 “unheeded
attack signs” articles, compared to the rates of 0.11 item/day before May and 0.18
item/day after June. Among the total of 19 front-page articles, 53 % (n = 10) were run in
May and June 2002. Thirty-five percent (n = 8) of all long items were collected in this
time frame.
These findings showed that major newspapers were inclined to make the case for
efforts to check on what was not done to prevent terrorist attacks. In other words, they
tried to speak for and to the public interest to keep government honest and responsible.
The papers assigned certain staff-writers covering the “September 11 lapses” story to
serve the people’s right to know. Attempts were made to reach out for exclusive
information to foster public understanding of the divisive and complex issue.
However, major newspapers, as a public watchdog, did not play the active role of
investigative journalism. They extensively covered unfolding events when they occurred,
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but stopped short of investigating what they described as an intelligence failure in a
persistent and aggressive manner.
One related, intriguing observation gleaned from the coverage: In the first week
after the terrorist attacks, all major newspapers raised the question why the U.S. failed to
deter September 11.78 As early as September 18, 2001 the San Francisco Chronicle broke
the news that India had had intelligence on the attacks before they happened and probably
passed that information on to U.S. authorities.79 The other papers also tried their first
independent investigation into possible failures in the month after September 11.80 As
they already had leads for a major story of national interest, the papers could have
pursued expensive investigative projects. Nevertheless, for some reason, they dropped
persistent reporting efforts in eight months before May 2002, mainly covered unfolding
events. None of four major newspapers dug into the story until May 2002, when dramatic
and very public developments fueled the controversy about what had not been done to
prevent the September 11 tragedy. The intensity of coverage gradually dropped down
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after June 2002, when the Congressional probe into the alleged intelligence lapses
produced less significant evidences.81 In other words, the newspapers never connected
dots or set the public agenda.

H4 predicted major newspapers met criteria listed as required to live up to the
established theory of social responsibility. Findings from preceding sections led to the
rejection of this hypothesis.
Analyses of news frequency, front-page placement, length confirmed hypothesis
1, which suggested that major newspapers provided adequate information to help foster
public understanding and discussion about the “September 11 lapses” controversy.82
Analyses of story treatment, tone and view supported hypothesis 2, which
predicted the papers provided balanced reporting and a forum for exchange of diverse
ideas on the issue.83
Observations on manner of reporting, sourcing, author and other findings on tone,
view, and the time element rejected hypothesis 3, which stated that the newspapers played
the active role of investigative journalism and aggressively checked on losses and failures
to serve the people’s right to know.84
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These results indicated that while major newspapers partially met basic criteria of
social responsibility, they failed to fulfill the required function of serving as an aggressive
watchdog against government, checking losses and failures. Newspaper coverage of the
“September 11 lapses” controversy succeeded in meeting some basic duties: providing
full access to the day’s intelligence,85 including information, discussion,86 exchange of
comment and criticism87 and speaking for and to the public interest in order to hold
government accountable.88 The newspapers paid attention to the intelligence failures story
from early on and gave it a higher priority in all aspects of coverage when dramatic
revelations in May and June 2002 drew greater public interest. They offered news and
debate on the controversial issue, trying to present it from different views and
perspectives.
In the meanwhile, none of the four newspapers adequately fulfilled one of the
most important tenets of social responsibility: serving as an aggressive watchdog
checking on government.89 Though newspaper coverage of the “September 11 lapses”
controversy seemed supportive to efforts to check on flaws, it was never an independent
investigation into what was not done to prevent terror attacks. The papers tried some
investigative attempts, but stopped short of a persistent follow-up to uncover what they
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described as “intelligence failings.” Major newspapers extensively covered dramatic
developments when they occurred, but failed to pursue investigative journalism in an
aggressive manner.

CONCLUSION
This content analysis found that the coverage of the “September 11 lapses” was a
particular case in which major U.S. newspapers did not live up to journalistic precepts
traditionally listed as required for the press to perform socially responsible in a democratic
society. The New York Times, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle and USA Today
were successful in meeting some basic functions set out by the social responsibility
theory, but failed to pursue independent investigative journalism as a public watchdog.
Major newspapers provided adequate information to foster public understanding
and discussion about the controversy. They served as a source of balanced reporting and a
forum for exchange of diverse ideas on the issue. In other words, they passed the
qualification tests of providing truthful, comprehensive and intelligent accounts of the
day’s event,90 of serving as common carriers of the perspective of the varied groups in
society, of representing the public to hold government accountable.91 Nevertheless, by
failing to aggressively play the role of investigative journalism at a critical time, major

90

Commission on Freedom of the Press, 21.

91

Schudson, 29.

51
newspapers missed an important point: to serve as a public watchdog92 representing the
people’s right to know.
The performance of major newspapers at critical times testified to their
preeminence as independent institutions at public service. But in this particular case, for
some special reason, they retreated from this good tradition.
The magnitude of September 11 and its aftermath suggested some arguments to
help explain why major newspapers did not fulfill the socially responsible role as they
were supposed to do.
First, media researchers have long pointed out that self-censorship inspired by
patriotism often arises during times of insecurities or national disasters.93 In emergency
cases, prior restraint can be seen as necessary protection of society despite its
contradictions to First Amendment principles.
September 11 was not only a sudden disaster, but also a national tragedy which
underlined America’s vulnerabilities. In the first few months after the terrorist attacks, the
temptation of censorship or self-censorship was present. The government attempted to
control news content, asking the media to honor restrictions for the sake of national
security.94 According to a Pew survey, the public endorsed censorship in responding to
the question: “which is more important to you, that the government be able to censor
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news stories it feels threaten national security, or that the news media be able to report
stories they feel are in the national interest?”95 American journalists had to walk a fine
line between warnings about undermining national security and the fear that they were not
playing their vital watchdog role.96 The question of where to draw the line between
nationalism and objectivity was a tough one for many reporters.97 In the wake of
September 11, while the desire to have the “why-it-could-happen” question answered was
compelling, Congressional leaders decided to forgo an immediate inquiry into the
intelligence lapses. They stated it would not be appropriate to conduct such an
investigation, which threatened to demoralize the nation in the new war on terrorism.98
The current research did not go far enough to explore whether the New York
Times, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, in responding to a
natural tendency of being part of the patriotic fervor, exercised self-censorship in their
coverage of the “September 11 lapses.” But media experts observed many instances in
which American journalists lost sight of their duty under the unique circumstance of
September 11. They either found themselves hard to be critical when the audience was
swept up in patriotism,99 or paid a price for being critics when Americans did not want
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critics.100
Second, as the carry-over from September 11, the subsequent war in Afghanistan
became the biggest concern both at home and abroad for a substantial period of time.
With the shock of terror attacks lingering, the “America Fights Back” story was right in
the center of hot news cycle. American newspapers, therefore, invested huge resources
and efforts in covering the conflict. As a result, they carried more stories about
Afghanistan on page one in the four months since September 11 than the previous four
decades.101 The intense coverage of the war in Afghanistan might arguably have
distracted major newspapers from digging into the controversy over the government’s
failure to prevent terrorist attacks. When the Afghan war overwhelmingly dominated the
media agenda, the “September 11 lapses” story was possibly relegated to a lower priority.
It could only emerge as breaking news later, when the Afghanistan story wore off, and
dramatic developments in the investigation into intelligence failings caught public
attention.
This research, qualitative by nature, did not show any generalizable evidences to
confirm these arguments. It just indicated newspaper coverage of the controversy
stopped short of an aggressive and persistent effort to pursue independent investigative
journalism, thereby failing to live up to the tenets of social responsibility.
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The fact is by pointing out a phenomenon without factually explaining its causes
the present research exposes its biggest limitation. Future research could conduct interviews
with newspaper reporters and editors who know better than anyone what key factors
affected the balance of the “September 11 lapses” coverage. Their stories would offer
important insights into the craft of each media message.
There is another limitation in the research that must be mentioned. The inclusion
of the San Francisco Chronicle in the sample was a reluctant choice because this author was
not able to retrieve related articles published by the Los Angeles Times from the LexisNexis database. The Los Angeles Times has long established itself as part of the elite
press and the top newspaper on the West Coast. It is the best candidate to join the New
York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today in any research on major newspapers.
However, the Lexis-Nexis search machine denies any attempts to retrieve Los Angeles
Times articles as far back as the year from September 12, 2001 to September 11, 2002.
Being the second largest newspaper on the West Coast, the San Francisco Chronicle
constituted an influential regional voice rather than a national one. Its coverage of the
“September 11 lapses” produced a total number of 77 articles, including 53 OpEd/Commentary items and 24 news stories. With Op-Ed/Commentary articles
outnumbering news stories, the San Francisco Chronicle stood out as the only newspaper
in the sample provided more of discussion than fact-based reporting on the issue. This
distinctive manner of coverage indicated the paper had its own priority and agenda in
fostering public understanding of the highly national controversy. This posed difficulties
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to comparative analysis of its work and the performance of the three national newspapers
- New York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today.
Despite all of the shortcomings, the present search provides a means to understand
a particular application of social responsibility principles in the operation of today’s
press.
Various studies have been conducted concerning different aspects of September
11 and the media, but this is one of the first to examine the coverage of the controversy
over government’s failures to deter terror attacks. The story itself stirred up debates until
late July 2004, when a bi-partisan commission appointed by the Congress released its
final report on intelligence failings leading up to September 11.
The underlying argument, suggested by this research, is that the press theory of
social responsibility can be tested in an exemplary scenario. One barometer of the
principles of social responsibility is that whether these ideals exist even in dilemma
situations, where the temptation of compromise is as compelling as the desire for
integrity.
The analysis of the “September 11 lapses” coverage recorded a particular instance
in which major newspapers failed to play their vital watchdog role at a critical but very
sensitive time. With disclosures of government’s failure to act on collected intelligence,
major newspapers faced the moment of truth to serve the people’s right to know. But for
some reason, they dropped independent investigative efforts, resting themselves on events
coverage. The papers did not really dig in the story until dramatic developments changed
their course. Once no more revelations was made public, they backed off from persistent
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follow-ups.
This leads to a larger consideration. The social responsibility theory, which
emphasizes the watchdog role of the media, is considered as one of the most fundamental
and distinguished elements of the press operation in America. But in his Rich Media,
Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times, McChesney mentioned to a
decline, even collapse, of journalism as a public service in every facet of the media.102 He
argued that the time-consuming and expensive investigative journalism “looking into
subjects that raise any questions about the ultimate legitimacy of our ruling institutions is
not welcome”103 in the domain of what he described as the “for-profit and corporate
media system.”104 Social responsibility theory accepts the need for the press as an
institution to maintain “its own financial self-sufficiency so as to be free from the
pressures of special interests.”105 However, the commercial aims of the news operation at
times conflict with the journalistic precepts traditionally listed as required for the press in
a democratic society. The question is if it is realistic to measure the performance of
today’s press against the established imperatives of social responsibility.
With all of the strengths and weaknesses, this research is beneficial as a steppingstone for future consideration on the same topic. Later projects may examine such
noteworthy issues as typical applications of the social responsibility doctrine in the
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operation of today’s press or the relevance of this theory in the current structure and new
trends of American media.

APPENDIX
Key Dates in the “Sept. 11 Lapses” Controversy: A Timeline

September 2001
A day after Sept. 11, question was raised about why the intelligence services failed to
deter terror attacks. President Bush and U.S. intelligence leaders said they had no
warnings to prepare for the attacks.

October 2001
U.S. intelligence outlined a cryptic message intercepted on the eve of Sept. 11 in which a
Qaeda member said Osama bin Laden was planning a Hiroshima.
News emerged that top Justice Department officials turned down a request by FBI agents
in Minnesota for a warrant to gather information on a suspect who was supposed to have
taken part in the terrorist plot.
American and allied forces launched the war in Afghanistan against terrorism.

November 2001
Congressional leaders agreed to delay a thorough investigation into government’s failure
to deter Sept. 11, citing the need to give the administration time to focus on the war on
terrorism.
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December 2001
Zacarias Moussaoui, a terror suspect, was indicted. He was arrested before the terrorist
attacks and later considered a material witness in the Sept. 11 probe.

January 2002
Bush, seeking to restrict investigations into Sept. 11 events, asked House and Senate
leaders to allow only two congressional committees to probe the government’s response
to terrorist attacks.

February 2002
Congressional intelligence committees announced a joint investigation into whether
intelligence failures left American vulnerable to the terror attacks.
CIA Director George Tenet, in his first appearance before Congress since Sept. 11,
rejected suggestion that U.S. intelligence services had failed to anticipate the attacks.

March 2002
INS was under heavy scrutiny for letting Sept. 11 hijackers into the United States for
granting two of them visas after they were killed in the attacks.

April 2002
Brit Snider, lead investigator of the House-Senate inquiry resigned under pressure.
Eleanor Hill succeeded her by May 2002.
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May 2002
Public interest in the case grew with the disclosures of F.B.I. field reports from Phoenix
and Minneapolis in summer 2001 about potential terrorist threats in flight schools, and
news of Mr. Bush’s intelligence briefing on Aug. 6, 2001 in which some attack signs
were ignored by the President. The Democrats questioned how much Bush knew before
Sept. 11 and urged for an independent commission to investigate. The administration
reacted angrily. Bush opposed to establishing the proposed commission.
F.B.I. Director Robert Mueller took the heat for his untrue statements. For the first time,
he acknowledged that Sept. 11 might have been preventable if F.B.I. responded
differently to all the pieces of available information.
Dan Rather said journalists had not been properly investigating since Sept. 11. He
described the pressures to conform that built up after the attacks.

June 2002
Congressional hearings began. Witnesses testified, revealing important details of Sept. 11
lapses. A Congressional committee questioned intelligence officials about missed
warnings of terrorist attacks. Chiefs of the F.B.I., C.I.A. and National Security Agency
detailed the missed clues pointing to Sept. 11.
In an interview with the New York Times Egyptian Hosni Mubarak said that his country’s
intelligence service warned U.S. officials about a week before Sept. 11, 2001 that alQaeda was in the advanced stage of preparing an attack on America. President Bush
dismissed Mubarak’s claims. He said: “I see no evidence today that said this country
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could have prevented the attacks.”

July 2002
A Congressional panel released a report on flaws that allowed Sept. 11 events. Pressure
expanded for the inquiry into intelligence lapses. A surprise House vote raised the
possibility that Bush might be forced to accept an independent commission.

August 2002
German authority said the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg identified the World Trade Center as
a target more than a year before Sept. 11, 2001.

September 2002
White House first agreed on an independent commission, but then backed off.
Investigators concluded U.S. intelligence services failed to adequately scrutinize
information they received before Sept. 11 about the terrorist plot.
First anniversary of Sept. 11 tragedy.
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